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PROCEDURE-RIGHT TO

CouNSEL UNDER SECTION 2255 OF THE JUDICIAL CODE-Petitioner, seeking to
attack a conviction for illegal possession of narcotics,1 was granted leave to
sue in form.a pauperis under 28 U.S.C. section 2255,2 but his request that
counsel be appointed for him was denied. Petitioner's section 2255 motion
to vacate judgment was denied.3 Petitioner then entered a second section
2255 petition alleging basically the same errors but adding that the court
had erred in not appointing counsel for his first petition. The second
motion was denied without a hearing on the ground that it was "the second
or successive motion for similar relief ...." 4 Petitioner appealed in forma
pauperis to the Seventh Circuit from the denial of his second section 2255
motion. The Seventh Circuit unanimously affirmed the district court's

1

The conviction was affirmed in United States v. Campbell, 282 F.2d 871 (7th Cir.

1960).
2 "A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress
claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in viola•
tion of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdic•
tion to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized
by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the
sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence •••• The sentencing court shall
not be required to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of
the same prisoner." 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958).
s The Supreme Court denied certiorari on this motion. 369 U.S. 825 (1962).
4 28 u.s.c. § 2255 (1958).
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denial of the second section 2255 motion.5 On rehearing, held, reversed.
The rationale of the recent Supreme Court decision in Gideon v. Wainwright6 indicates that counsel must be appointed for an indigent in a
section 2255 proceeding. Campbell v. United States, 318 F.2d 874 (7th Cir.
1963).
In Johnson v. Zerbst1 the Supreme Court held that, in general, a defendant has a right to counsel in federal criminal trials, and recently this right
was'extended to encompass federal criminal appeals. 8 However, the Supreme
Court has never decided specifically whether such a right exists in a third
substantial area of federal criminal litigation, namely, collateral attack
proceedings as prescribed by 28 U.S.C. section 2255.9 In the absence of a
definitive Supreme Court ruling upon this issue, the circuit courts have
reached variant results.10 In a majority of the circuits the appointment of
counsel for a section 2255 proceeding is purely discretionary.11 A few
circuits have held that the right to counsel in a section 2255 proceeding
is contingent upon the nature of the issues raised under the motion; 12 and
in one case the Second Circuit suggested that the right may indeed be
absolute. 13 The majority rule is apparently based on the idea that section
No. 13846, 7th Cir., March 18, 1963.
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
304 U.S. 458 (1938).
8 See Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963);
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674 (1958);
Johnson v. United States, 352 U.S. 565 (1957). Some gaps still remain in the appellate
procedure. For example, in the interim period between conviction and appointment of
appeal counsel the indigent is left to his own devices to get necessary papers filed in time
to maintain appellate privileges. See Bosky, The Right to Counsel in Appellate Proceedings,
45 MINN. L. REV. 783 (1961).
o In addition, the Supreme Court has never decided the issue of right to counsel in
habeas corpus proceedings. A § 2255 motion is, by the terms of the statute, either a sub•
stitutc for, or a preliminary action to, a habeas corpus proceeding. The purpese of § 2255
is to hold any required hearing in the sentencing court because of the inconvenience of
transporting court officials and witnesses to the district of confinement. Habeas corpus
actions must be brought in the district of confinement. As a result, § 2255 generally enjoys
more popularity than habeas corpus as a means of collateral attack.
10 It should be noted that although § 2255 does not specifically provide for the
representation of the prisoner by council, the indigent can make use of § 1915(d), which
provides for counsel in federal proceedings. "The court may request an attorney to
represent any such person unable to employ counsel and may dismiss the case if the allega•
tion of poverty is untrue or if satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(d) (Supp. IV, 1963). The discretionary language in § 1915(d) has been interpreted
to provide an absolute right to counsel. Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Lane
v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963); Johnson v. United States, 352 U.S. 565 (1957).
11 Listed in the order of the circuits, the most recent cases expounding the majority
rule arc Green v. United States, 256 F.2d 483 (1st Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 854
(1958); United States v. Caufield, 207 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1953); Taylor v. United States,
229 F.2d 826 (8th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 986 (1956); Edwards v. United States,
286 F.2d 704 (9th Cir. 1961); Tubbs v. United States, 249 F.2d 37 (10th Cir. 1957).
12 These circuits have drawn a distinction between issues raised involving questions.
of fact (the indigent being entitled to counsel) and issues involving questions of law (appointment of counsel being purely discretionary): United States v. Neims, 291 F.2d 39()'
(4th Cir. 1961); Pruitt v. United States, 217 F.2d 648 (5th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S.
907 (1955).
13 United States v. Paglia, 190 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1951).
Ii
6
7
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2255 proceedings are primarily civil in nature and hence do not fall
within the ambit of rights granted protection to defendants in "criminal
prosecutions" by the sixth amendment. Appointment of counsel is therefore properly said to be left in the discretion of the reviewing court.14
While categorizing section 2255 proceedings as civil rather than criminal
seems unrealistic, this approach was nevertheless the foundation of the
rule followed by the Seventh Circuit prior to the principal case. 11s
Although the Supreme Court's attitude toward the issue is unclear, dicta
in two Supreme Court cases would seem to indicate that the Supreme
Court does not consider appointment of counsel mandatory in a section
2255 action. In United States v. Hayman 16 the Supreme Court noted that
"unlike the criminal trial where the guilt of the defendant is in issue . • .
a proceeding under section 2255 is an independent and collateral inquiry
into the validity of the conviction."17 The labelling of a section 2255 proceeding as an "independent and collateral inquiry" was apparently the
basis of the Seventh Circuit's prior adherence to the discretionary appointment rule. 18 In addition, in Sanders v. United States19 the Court, again in
dictum, stated the following in discussing section 2255:
"[W]e think it clear that the sentencing court has discretion to ascertain whether the claim is substantial before granting a full evidentiary
hearing. In this connection, the sentencing court might find it useful
to appoint counsel to represent the applicant." 20
However, in deciding the principal case the Seventh Circuit rejected
the dicta in Hayman and Sanders and chose instead to be guided by its view
of the implications of the recent Supreme Court decision in Gideon v.
Wainwright. 21 Gideon specifically held that the fourteenth amendment requires the states to follow the federal rule established under the sixth
amendment and to appoint counsel in criminal prosecutions unless the
right is competently and intelligently waived. It is important to note that
Gideon itself had no direct effect upon section 2255 proceedings. In dealing
only with the elementary rights of state criminal defendants, Gideon did not
overtly purport to modify what was already settled in federal courts.22 In
14 For an excellent discussion of the history of § 2255 in the circuit courts, see Comment,
30 U. CHI. L. REv. 583 (1963).
15 United States v. Caufield, 207 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1953). The rule was reiterated in
the Seventh Circuit only five months before the principal case. McCartney v. United
States, 311 F.2d 475 (7th Cir. 1963).
16 342 U.S. 205 (1952).
11 Id. at 222.
18 McCartney v. United States, 311 F.2d 475 (7th Cir. 1963).
10 373 U.S. I (1963), 62 MxcH. L. REv. 903 (1964).
20 373 U.S. at 21. (Emphasis added.) In Sanders, however, the Court also indicated that
it considered § 2255 to be a "criminal collateral procedure" and not a civil procedure.
Id. at 22.
21 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
22 The significance of Gideon v. Wainwright has been well recognized. See Comment, 11
LOYOLA L. REv. 288 (1963); Note, 77 HARV. L. REv. 103 (1963); Note, 39 NOTRE DAME LAW.
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addition, Sanders, containing the dictum indicating that appointment of
counsel in a section 2255 proceeding is still discretionary, was decided after
Gideon. In fact, the Seventh Circuit even conceded that Gideon did not
dictate the result in the principal case. The majority opinion in the principal case stated:
"The precise holding in Gideon does not require this result. The
holding there involved a state conviction, not a motion under 28
U.S.C. § 2255. We are convinced, however, that the Supreme Court's
view of the right to counsel reflected in the Gideon opinion indicates
the result we have reached."2 8
The important question, therefore, is why the Seventh Circuit purposely
ignored the dicta in Hayman and Sanders, and instead applied the Gideon
philosophy beyond the literal meaning indicated by the Supreme Court.
The reasons, although not fully discussed by the court, seem obvious. The
twentieth century American ideal of justice would seem to be sweeping
enough to include as many safeguards to justice as are reasonably possible.24
Mr. Justice Black said in Gideon:
"[R]eason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary
system of criminal justice any person haled into court, who is too poor
to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. This seems to be an obvious truth. . . ."211
In other words, the Seventh Circuit believes that the same safeguards made
mandatory in state courts by Gideon should also be made mandatory in
section 2255 actions. The extension of Gideon is the court's means to this
desired end.
The principal case, therefore, shows that the repercussions of Gideon
will probably not be limited to state court proceedings. The Seventh Circuit has implied from Gideon the conclusion that the mandate is applicable
to any action, whether labelled criminal or civil, related to an original criminal prosecution. As Mr. Justice Sutherland once said of the indigent, "He
243 (1963); Note, 65 W. VA. L. REv. 297 (1963); 15 Au. L. REv. 568 (1963); 49 A.B.A.J. 587
(1963); 12 DE PAUL L. REv. 306 (1963); 26 GA. B.J. 96 (1963); 47 MARQ. L. REv. 111 (1963);
37 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 358 (1963); 32 U. CrNc. L. REv. 408 (1963); 24 U. Pm. L. REv. 851
(1963).
28

Principal case at 875.

24 See Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue
on "the Most Pervasive Right" of an Accused, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1962). In this regard
Gideon may have raised more questions than it answered. For example, should the right
to counsel be extended to an indigent at the moment of arrest, at the police interrogation,
or at trial? See Beany, Right to Counsel Before Arraignment, 45 MINN. L. REv. 771 (1961);
Douglas, foreword to The Right to Counsel: A Symposium, 45 MINN. L. REv. 693 (1961).
Should the right to counsel encompass misdemeanors as well as felonies? See Comment,
48

CALIF.

L. REv. 501 (1960),

211 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,344 (1963).
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requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings
against him."26
Gerald ]. Laba

26

Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).

